Chapter XVI
Endnotes

1 This chapter was originally prepared in Japanese by Maj. Hiroshi Komatsu, Imperial Japanese Army. For duty assignments of this officer, cf. n. 1, Chapter XIV. All source materials cited in this chapter are located in G-2 Historical Section Files, GHQ FEC.

2 Statement by Maj. Shigeharu Asaeda, Staff Officer (Operations), Fourteenth Area Army.

3 (1) Hito Sakusen Kiroku Dai Sank, Dai Nikan Furoku Reite Sakusen Kiroku (Philippines Operations Record, Phase Three, Vol. II, Supplement: Leyte Operations) 1st Demobilization Bureau, Oct 46, p. 190. (2) Statement by Maj. Gen. Yoshiharu Tomochika, Deputy-Chief of Staff, Thirty-fifth Army.

4 After the American landing near Albuera, Leyte, 8 December, Lt. Gen. Gyosaku Morozumi, 30th Division commander, transferred the division command post to Impalutao from Agusan because he estimated that the enemy might subsequently land at Macajalar Bay in conjuction with an airborne drop near Del Monte airfield. (Statement by Col. Hyobunosuke Yamazu, Chief of Staff, 30th Division.

5 30th Division Operations Order No. A-79 (Thirty-fifth Army Operations Order No. A-150), 25 Dec 44 . Eighth Army ADVATIS Translation 8AAAE-T 75, 12 Apr 45.

6 Statement by Maj. Gen. Tomochika, previously cited.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 The larger units which had been transferred into Leyte from other sectors of the Army area included the following: (Cf. Chapter XIII.)

10 This concentration along the south flank of the Thirty-fifth Army area was the continuing result of the estimates made during August and September that the most probable target of the initial enemy invasion would be Mindanao. (Cf. Chapter XI, n. 116.) No redistribution of troops was made following the enemy landing on Leyte.

11 Until 14 November, the Japanese had considered this entire inland sector relatively secure behind the ring of defenses extending from Leyte through Surigao thence along the south coast of Mindanao to Zamboanga and down the Sulu Archipelago. On that date Lt. Gen. Suzuki, alarmed by the intensification of enemy surface activity in the Mindanao Sea, ordered the forces stationed on Cebu to accelerate defense preparations. It was not until the large American convoy sailed through the Sulu Sea on route to Mindoro, however, that the Japanese dream of " Safety Zone " was finally shattered. At that time the island garrisons began to construct defensive positions in earnest. ( 1) Statement by Lt. Col. Kotaro Katogawa, Staff Officer (Operations), Thirty-fifth Army. (2) Thirty-fifth Army Operations Order No. A-91, 14 Nov 44. Dai Sanjugo Gun Hatchaku Bunsho Utsushi (Document Files, Thirty-fifth Army Headquarters) Maj. Kohei Takahashi, Staff Officer (Operations), Thirty-fifth Army, Jan 46. This document was copied from original documents by Maj. Takahashi at the American Prisoner of War Camp on Leyte, January 1946.

12 Maj. Gen. Kono had been placed in command of the Army ground forces on these islands in mid-November, when the 102d Division headquarters displaced from Bacolod to Leyte. (Statement by Maj. Gen. Tomochika, previously cited.)

13 (1) Teikoku Kaigun Senji Hensei (Wartime Organization of the Imperial Navy) Navy General Staff, 15 Dec 44. (2) Nairei Teiyo Bessaisu (Teiin Kankei) (Naval Confidential Regulations Attached File: Naval Personnel), Secretariate, Navy Ministry, 1 Feb 44. (3) Senkyuhyakuyonjuyon oyobi Yonjugo Nen Zai Hito Nihon Gun Heiryoku  (Strength of Japanese Forces in the Philippines, 1944-45) 1st and 2d Demobilization Bureaus, Nov-Dec 49 .

14 Statement by Capt. Kenkichi Shigaki, Staff Officer (Operations), 33d Special Base Force.

15 Statement by Lt. Col. Shiro Nonogaki, Staff Officer (Operations), 2d Air Division.

16 Strength of Japanese Forces in the Philippines, 1944-45, op. cit.

17 On this date, Thirty-fifth Army received a further order from Fourteenth Area Army reiterating the provisions of the 20 December order. The order also directed Thirty-fifth Army to transfer the 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry (16th Division), from Catabalogan, Samar, to the northern tip of Samar, where it was to come under the command of the Noguchi Detachment on Bicol Peninsula, Luzon. Fourteenth Area Army Operations Order No. A-272, 25 Dec 44. Document Files, Thirty-fifth Army Headquarters, op. cit.

18 Statement by Maj. Gen. Tomochika, previously cited.

19 Ibid.

20 Both of these divisions commenced the withdrawal on the night of 21-22 December following the enemy's penetration of the 1st Division left flank. Although the Army order of 21 December had not yet reached either division, a withdrawal was permitted within the terms of the Army Commander's instructions of 19 December. (Cf. Chapter XIII, p. 403.) Philippine Operations Record, Phase Three, op. cit. Vol. II, Suppl., pp. 192-3.

21 Ibid., p. 198.

22 At this time there were about 30 landing barges, including those under repair, along the northeastern coast of Cebu and in the port of Cebu. In addition, ten large landing barges were expected to reach northern Cebu from Luzon early in January. (Statement by Maj. Manzo Yamazaki, Staff Officer (Operations), Thirty-fifth Army.)

23 Lt. Gen. Takaji Wachi, Chief of Staff, Thirty-fifth Army, accompanied this staff group as far as Cebu on his way to Fourteenth Area Army headquarters in Baguio, where, late in January, he presented a report on the Leyte situation. On 20 Feburuary, Lt. Gen. Wachi was appointed Deputy-Chief of Staff, Southern Army. Simultaneously, Maj. Gen. Yoshiharu Tomochika was reappointed Chief of Staff, Thirty-fifth Army, the post he had held prior to the reorganization of Thirty-fifth Army headquarters on 14 November 1944. (Cf. Chapter XIII, n. 186.)

24 Statement by Lt. Col. Katogawa, previously cited.

25 The strength of the Japanese forces assembled in the Mt. Canguipot area as of 2 January 1945 totalled about 10,718, broken down as follows:

In addition to these troops, there were an estimated 6,500 isolated northeast of Ormoc and along the Lubi trail, making a total strength of about 17,200. (1) Document Files, Thirty-fifth Army Headquarters, op. cit. (2) Statement by Maj. Yamazaki, previously cited.

26 Dai Hyakuni Shidan Sakusen Keika Gaiyo (Summary of Operations, 102d Division) Home Depot Division, Apr 46, p. 24.

27 In view of many indeterminate factors, the Army staff envisaged this plan primarily as a general guide. Moreover, the contents were not given wide distribution because of the harmful effect the disclosure might have on some of the Leyte forces. Those units which were most fit for subsequent operations were, in general, to have the highest priority in the evacuation. (Statement by Maj. Gen. Tomochika, previously cited.)

28 Philippine Operations Record, Phase Three, op. cit. Vol. II Suppl. pp. 209-11.

29 About 743 men were successfully evacuated from Leyte in the four echelons. No other 1st Division troops were evacuated. (Statement by Col. Junkichi Okabayashi, Chief of Staff, 1st Division.)

30 Philippine Operations Record, Phase Three, op. cit. Vol. II Suppl., pp. 203-6, 211-2.

31 (1) Ibid., p. 193. (2) Statement by Maj. Yamazaki, previously cited.

32 (1) Philippine Operations Record, Phase Three, op. cit. Vol II. Suppl., p. 194. (2) Statement by Maj. Yamazaki, previously cited.

33 One of the major factors influencing this decision was a request from the Rear Area Command Post early in March urging Lt. Gen. Suzuki to transfer his headquarters to a point which would permit him to resume control of the entire Army area. This request was prompted by reports of the enemy landing on Palawan on 28 February. (Statement by Maj. Gen. Tomochika, previously cited.)

34 Statement by Maj. Yamazaki, previously cited.

35 Following this dispersal, continuing enemy clean-up campaigns and the acute shortage of food resulted in further losses until, by the date of final surrender, only a few survivors were still alive.

36 The staff of the Rear Area Command Post had prepared, late in January, the following estimate of probable enemy intentions with regard to the Army area:

1. The enemy will probably initiate a clean-up campaign in the Visayan area about the time he gains control of Luzon.

2. At this time it cannot be determined whether or not the American forces will begin a Visayan campaign and a Mindanao offensive simultaneously. It is considered more probable, however, that operations will be undertaken against the former prior to launching an attack against Mindanao. This estimate was promptly dispatched to all elements of the Army except those on Leyte. Army headquarters on Leyte had prepared in December an estimate not in agreement with this one, (Cf. P. 490) but it was not disseminated to subordinate commands because of the inadequate communication between Leyte and other islands at that time. (Statement by Lt. Col. Katogawa, previously cited.)

37 Earlier in February enemy forces cleared out the northern tip of Samar, which was within the Thirty-fifth Army area. The Japanese forces remaining on the island were not under the control of the Army, however. The 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry, was under command of the Noguchi Detachment on Bicol, and the 1st Battalion, 26th Independent Mixed Regiment, remained under command of its parent regiment, then en route to the Manila area. Both of these battalions had been ordered by mid-January to transfer to Luzon but were unable to make the move because of lack of transportation.

38 Statement by Maj. Gen. Toshio Nishimura, Deputy-Chief of Staff, Fourteenth Area Army.

39 Total strength of the Japanese forces in the Palawan area, 27 February, was about 1200. Order of battle was as follows:

(1) Puerto Princesa Defense Operations Order No. 10, 22 Jan 45. Eighth Army ADVATIS Translation 8AAAE- T 36, 8 Mar 45. (2) Statements by 1st Lt. Toru Ogawa, commander, Supply Company, 131st Airfield Battalion, and Medical Probational Officer Toshimichi Urata, attached to 3d Co., 174th Independent Infantry Battalion.

40 Radio Message Batsu 7 (77th Inf. Brig.), No. 104. Dispatched by Maj. Gen. Kono at Bacolod to Obayashi Unit, Palawan, 21 Feb 45. Eighth Army ADVATIS Translation 8AAAE-T 51, 21 Mar 45.

41 On 15 February, the Army guard units on Pandanan and Dumaran Islands were ordered to withdraw as soon as possible and assemble at Puerto Princesa. Palawan Sector Unit Order, 15 Feb 45. Eighth Army ADVATIS Translation 8AAAE-T 36, 8 Mar 45.

42 Puerto Princesa Defense Operations Order No. 10, 22 Jan 45. Eighth Army ADVATIS Translation 8AAAE-T 36, 8 Mar 45.

43 The American invasion force consisted of one escort carrier, two battleships, seven destroyers, three transports and over 40 LST's. The landing began at 1050 hours on 28 February. Shukan Joho Dai Hyakujunigo (Weekly Intelligence Reports, No. 112) Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section, 3 Mar 45.

44 (1) The 3d Co. (less two plats.), 174th Ind. Inf. Bn., which had withdrawn from Dumaran Island shortly after receiving the order of 15 February, arrived at Fondeado Island, about 12 miles north of Puerto Princesa, on 18 February. After hearing the heavy bombardment then progressing in the Puerto Princesa area, the company landed on Palawan near Babuyan, four miles north of Fondeado Island. En route to Puerto Princesa, it fought off guerrillas and foraged for food until late June, when the company finally dispersed and melted into the mountains. (Statement by Medical Probational Officer, Urata, previously cited.) (2) The Japanese garrison on Pandanan Island could not comply with the order of 15 February to withdraw because of lack of transportation. (Statement by 1st Lt. Ogawa, previously cited.) (3) On q April an enemy task force invaded Coron and annihilated the small Japanese garrison on the island.

45 The official chains of command of the Japanese forces in the Zamboanga area were as follows:

(Statement by Maj. Yasura Hanada, Staff Officer, 54th Independent Mixed Brigade.)

46 Order of battle of the forces in the Zamboanga area at this time was as follows:

47 Originally Lt. Gen. Hojo planned to defend positions on the beaches of Zamboanga. Upon receipt late in December of the Thirtyfifth Army order requiring sustained resistance, however, the positions were moved farther to the rear. Ibid.

48 Ibid.

49 The main strength of the brigade retreated via several routes through the mountains to Sibuco by mid-May. At this point the Japanese forces were again attacked by the enemy and once more forced to withdraw into the interior. When the enemy attacked the remnants on 26 May at Anungan, the brigade was finally forced to disperse. Ibid.

50 The Tawitawi group lay outside the Thirty-fifth Army zone of responsibility, coming under the Thirty-seventh Army on Borneo. Until early February the islands had been garrisoned by the main strength of the 25th Independent Mixed Regiment, which was then withdrawn to Borneo by order of Thirty-seventh Army. Sanga Sanga was entirely undefended, while Bongao was garrisoned by a small naval detachment of about 250 men of the 33d Naval Garrison Unit. On 27 April, survivors of the latter garrison escaped by boat to Sandakan. (Statements by Col. Shinshichi Iemura, commander, 25th Independent Mixed Regiment and Lt. Comdr. Yoshizumi Asano, Chief Paymaster, 33d Naval Garrison Unit.)

51 Total strength of the Jolo garrison at this time numbered about 3,000 Army personnel and 500 attached naval personnel. The order of battle was as follows:

55th Ind. Mixed Brig.                                                      365th Ind. Inf. Bn. (less one co.)

363d Ind. Inf. Bn.                                                            Misc. naval personnel

Dokuritsu Konsei Dai Gojugo Ryodan no Sento (Battle Report of 55th Independent Mixed Brigade) Nov 47. Unpublished memoirs of Maj. Tokichi Temmyo, commander, 365th Independent Infantry Battalion.

52 Ibid.

53 Early in July, because of a shortage of rations and guerrilla activities in the area around Mt. Tumazangos, the Japanese forces moved to the west coast. One month later the remnants moved again, this time to Mt. Bahu, about seven miles southeast of Jolo. By the date of surrender, i6 September, only 87 Japanese still survived. Most of these were victims of various tropical diseases, and all were suffering from malnutrition. Ibid.

54 Of the eight airstrips on northern Negros, seven, located at Bacolod, Silay, Fabrica, Talisay, Tanza, Manapla and Salavia, were used by the 2d Air Division. The eighth, near Binalbagan, was used by the Navy.

55 Lt. Gen. Seiichi Terada, 2d Air Division commander, was the senior officer in the area at this time. He was expected, however, to transfer his headquarters at any time. The 2d Air Division had been placed under the command of the Third Air Army in Singapore about mid-February. Thereafter, the three-fold mission of the air division was to reconnoiter the enemy actions in the Leyte area, secure the airfields in the Visayan area, and transport air personnel to other areas. Permission for the transfer was not forthcoming until mid-March. Finally, on 27 March, Lt. Gen. Terada moved his headquarters to Mindanao, leaving all air ground units in the Negros area under the command of Lt. Gen. Kono. (Statement by Lt. Col. Nonogaki, previously cited.)

56 Order of battle of the Japanese forces on northern Negros at this time was as follows:

Hq., 77th Inf. Brig.                                                                                  Hq., 6th Air Sector Unit

172d Ind. Inf. Bn. (less 2d Co.)                                                               One AAA btry.

354th Ind. Inf. Bn.                                                                                    Three airfield bns.

Elms. Of 355th Ind. Inf. Bn.                                                                      Four airfield cos.

Transport Unit, 102d Division                                                                   Air supply and repair depots

Six cos., 102d Division Engineer Unit                                                        Elms. of misc. air service units

Misc. service units                                                                                  Elms. of naval ground units Elms. of shipping units

(1) Unit Disposition, undated. Eighth Army ADVATIS Translation 8AAAE-T 76, 13 Apr 45. (2) Yuge Force, Tokaido Sector Defense Plan, 10 Mar 45. Eighth Army ADVATIS Translation 8AAAE-T 74, 11 Apr 45. (3) Interrogation of Lt. Col. Shigekatsu Aritomi, Staff Officer (Operations), 102d Division. 10th Information and Historical Service, Headquarters Eighth United States Army.

57 Cf. p. 493. Kono was promoted to Lt. Gen. effective 1 March.

58 The outline of this defense plan had been completed during December, but because the guerrillas were in control of the mountain area selected, the Japanese were unable to proceed with the construction of fortifications. It was not until early in February, when the guerrillas were driven from the area, that the ground forces finally began preparation of defenses. (Statement by Maj. Kiyoshi Suzuki, Staff Officer (Supply), 2d Air Division.)

59 The Army airfields at Silay and Salavia were to be used as long as possible. 6th Air Sector Operations Order No. 29o, 28 Mar 45. Eighth Army ADVATIS Translation, 8AAAE-T 72, 9 Apr 45.

60 After the American landing on Mindoro in mid-December, Maj. Gen. Kono's staff discussed the possibility of transferring to Negros the remainder of the Panay garrison which had been reduced by the dispatch of the 171st Independent Infantry Battalion to Leyte in October. Due to inadequate shipping facilities and enemy air interdiction, however, the project was dropped. (Statements by Lt. Col. Katogawa and Lt. Col. Aritomi, both previously cited.)

61 The Japanese forces on Panay at this time totalled about 2,500. The order of battle was as follows:

Iloilo sector:                                                                                               San Jose sector:

170th Ind. Inf. Bn. (less 4th Co.)                                                                   4th Co., 170th Ind. Inf. Bn.

1st Co., 171st Ind. Inf. Bn.                                                                            Elms. of air ground units Misc. units

(Interrogation of Capt. Sadayoshi Ishikawa, attached to 170th Ind. Inf. Bn. 10th Information and Historical Service, Headquarters Eighth United States Army.)

62 Shortly after this withdrawal was completed, the battalion commander ordered the forces near San Jose to assemble in the main positions. This detachment, after brief skirmishes with guerrilla forces, arrived in the Bocari area on to April. Ibid.

63 Statement by Lt. Col. Aritomi, previously cited.

64 Faulty communications between Lt. Gen. Kono's headquarters and the Japanese company stationed near Pulupandan, where the enemy landed, prevented transmission of reports of the enemy invasion. Ibid.

65 These forces completed the transfer by 5 April. (Interrogation of Lt. Col. Aritomi, previously cited.

66 Ibid.

67 The evacuation from Leyte of Lt. Gen. Fukue, 10d Division commander, created an unfavorable reaction in Army headquarters even though permission had been granted. The Army commander temporarily relieved Lt. Gen. Fukue of his command and placed him in restriction in the Cebu Army hospital. He was subsequently released on 24 March by the Army commander and restored to his command. (Statement by Maj. Gen. Tomochika, previously cited.)

68 Although Rear Adm. Harada had been informed by Lt. Gen. Suzuki on 1 November that he would command army units in the Cebu sector, he nevertheless was unable to relieve these units of their role in support of the decisive battle operations. Rear Adm. Harada therefore exercised very little actual control over the army units in the Cebu sector until February. (Statement by Capt. Shigaki, previously cited.)

69 First-line positions were originally prepared along the beach. In mid-February, however, it was decided to abandon these positions and construct a new first line farther inland.

70 (1) Sketch Map Showing Troop Dispositions on Cebu and Mactan Islands, owner and unit unknown. Eighth Army ADVATIS Translation 8AAAE-T 85, 29 Apr 45. (2) Statement by Col. Okabayashi, previously cited.

71 Order of battle of Japanese forces in the vicinity of Cebu city on 25 March was as follows:

Hq., 102d Division                                                                        Shipping units

Hq., 78th Inf. Brig.                                                                          Replacement Unit, 1st Shipping Engr. Unit

173d Ind. Inf. Bn.                                                                            8th Surface Trans. Bn.

One composite co., 54th Ind. Mixed Brig.                                      Cebu Branch, Shipping Depot

Elms. of miscellaneous service units                                               Elms. of miscellaneous shipping units

Hq., 33d Special Base Force                                                          Elms. of Army air service units 33d Special Base Force

Misc. naval ground units

Central Philippine Airfield Unit

(1) Summary of Operations, 102d Division, op. Cit., pp. 28-9. (2) Sketch Map Showing Troop Dispositions on Cebu and Mactan Island, owner and unit unknown. Eighth Army ADVATIS Translation 8AAAE-T 85, 29 Apr 45.

72 The enemy landing on Cebu terminated the operation of Japanese midget submarines in the Mindanao Sea. Eight of these craft had been assigned to the 33d Special Base Force between October 1944 and January 1945. Using Dumaguete as an advance base, these midget submarines launched torpedo attacks against enemy convoys moving through the Mindanao Sea. Three were destroyed prior to the Cebu invasion, two were destroyed while attacking the Allied invasion convoy, and the remaining three were scuttled by the Japanese. (1) Hito Homen ni okeru Sensuikan Sakusen (Submarine Operations in the Philippine Area) 2d Demobilization Bureau, Dec 47, pp. 41-4 (2) Statement by Capt. Shigaki, previously cited.

73 Cf. n. 67.

74 Outline of Directives for Future Operations of the Thirty-fifth Army in the Visayan Sector, 23 Mar 45. Eighth Army ADVATIS Translation 166LD-T 87, 1 Jun 45.

75 Summary of Operations, 102d Division, op. cit., p. 35.

76 Statement by Capt. Shigaki, previously cited.

77 Summary of Operations, 102d Division, op. cit., p. 38.

78 Ibid.

79 Statement by Col. Okabayashi, previously cited.

80 Interrogation of 1st Lt. Komei Fujitomi, 174th Independent Infantry Battalion. 10th Information and Historical Service, Headquarters Eighth United States Army.

81 (1) Strength of Japanese Forces in the Philippines, 1944-45, op. cit. (1) Statements by Col. Yamazu and Lt. Col. Nonogaki, both previously cited, and Lt. Gen. Jiro Harada, commander, 100th Division.

82 That portion of Highway 3 between Kabacan and Kibawe was generally impassable to truck transportation even though Japanese engineers devoted considerable effort toward keeping it in repair. Less important roads were even more unfit for traffic, with frequent disruption caused by swollen streams or swampy areas. (Statement by Lt. Gen. Gyosaku Morozumi, commander, 30th Division)

83 Order of battle of the Japanese forces in central Mindanao in mid-April was as follows:

(1) 30th Division Operations Order No, A-80, 25 Dec 44. Eighth Army ADVATIS Translation. 8AAAE-T 75, 12 Apr 45. (2) Statement by Lt. Col. Nonogaki, previously cited.

84 Order of battle of the Japanese forces in the Davao and Digos areas in mid-April was as follows:

(Statements by Lt. Gen. Harada and Lt. Col. Nonogaki, both previously cited and Comdr. Shinji Saji, Staff Officer (Operations), 3d Special Base Force.)

85 This represented a slight modification of the estimate made by Lt. Gen. Morozumi in December 1944, at the time of the American landing on Mindoro. At that time he had considered it slightly more probable that the main enemy landing in an invasion of Mindanao would be made in the Davao area rather than on the north coast around Cagayan. A secondary landing at Cotabato or along Sarangani Bay was also anticipated in this estimate. (Statement by Col. Yamazu, previously cited.)

86 By the end of April all division units had completed strong field fortifications. (Statement by Col. Muneichi Hattori, Chief of Staff, 100th Division.)

87 Statement by Lt. Gen. Harada, previously cited.

88 Ibid.

89 The Digos Sector Unit was disposed to counter an enemy amphibious invasion of the beaches in that area. In the event of such a landing, the Japanese were to prevent the enemy's unrestricted use of Padada airfield southwest of Digos. Ibid.

90 In the period following receipt of the Army order late in December, the Japanese garrison in the Sarangani Bay area was progressively reduced in view of the revised estimate that the enemy would not now launch a major assault in that area. The 74th Infantry, 3oth Division, was pulled out during late December and January, the tooth Division replacing that regiment with the 167th Independent Infantry Battalion (less one co.) in January. About 20 March this battalion (less two cos.) was ordered back to the Davao area. (Statements by Lt. Gen. Harada and Col. Yamazu, both previously cited.)

91 Both companies in the East Coast Unit began withdrawing to Davao late in February. Lack of transportation and guerrilla interference prevented their arrival before the surrender. (Statement by Lt. Gen. Harada, previously cited.)

92 One other provisional battalion, mainly comprised of the Southern Philippine Airfield Unit, was to remain under the direct command of Rear Adm. Doi. (Statement by Comdr. Saji, previously cited.)

93 Dai Sanju Shidan Hyo Butai Kodo Gaiyo (Summary of Operations, 30th Division (Hyo) Force) Home Depot Division, undated.

94 This battalion had been ordered, on or about 20 March, to move to Malaybalay where it was to revert to regimental control. Ibid. Cf. n. 90.

95 Early in April the 30th Engineer Regiment commander, who was then in command of the South Sector Unit, was ordered to proceed north and supervise the construction of defenses in the Dalirig area. Simultaneously, four engineer companies were attached to the 30th Transport Regiment which was then engaged in transporting supplies from Kabacan to the Malaybalay area. (Statement by Col. Yamazu, previously cited.)

96 Dal Hyaku. Shidan (Kyo) Butai Kodo Gaiyo (Summary of Operations, 100th Division (Kyo) Force) Home Depot Division, undated.

97 The 1st Battalion, 30th Field Artillery Regiment en route to Malaybalay was cut off by the rapid enemy advance and, on the night of 18 April, began withdrawing on its own initiative to the Saraugaui Bay sector. In early May, this battalion was again placed under the 100th Division and merged into the Saraugaui Sector Unit. (Statement by Maj. Makoto Takatsuka, commander, 1st Battalion, 30th Field Artillery Regiment.)

98 The forces, in addition to the South Sector Unit, included the main strength of the 1st Battalion, 74th Infantry, the 3d Company, 30th Engineer Regiment, and two companies, 100th Division Engineer Unit. 30th Division Operations Order No. A-106. X Corps ADVATIS Translation XCAET 0058, 29 Apr 45.

99 Statement by Col. Yamazu, previously cited.

100 Philippine Operations Record, Phase Three, op. cit. Vol. II, Suppl., pp. 220-1.

101 Shortly thereafter, on 3 May, the d Air Division headquarters transferred to Singapore in compliance with a Third Air Army order. On 25 May the headquarters was deactivated. (Statement by Lt. Col. Kazuyoshi Obata, Staff Officer (Operations), 2d Air Division.)

102 Lt. Gen. Suzuki, Thirty-fifth Army Commander, left Cebu Island on 10 April with Maj. Gen. Tomochika and other members of Army headquarters in five bancas. The bancas became separated while en route to Mindanao. After the surrender it was learned that the Army Commander had been killed during a strafing attack. (Statement by Maj. Gen. Tomochika, previously cited.)

103 On 1 June, a report was received by 30th Division that the regiment had arrived in the vicinity of Dalwangan. No further word, however, was forthcoming from this unit. (Statement by Lt. Gen. Morozumi, previously cited.)

104 By 5 June the 30th Division had only sufficient rations to last about two weeks. Nevertheless, it was believed that the trek over the mountains could be made in about two weeks. Actually, the survivors who finally reached the Waloe area marched almost two months through the trackless mountain wilderness. When they finally arrived, they found the 3d Battalion, 41st Infantry, under heavy attack by an enemy force which had moved south. Shortly thereafter, the remnants of the Japanese force began to move to the east coast but were able to march only eight miles southeast before the surrender. Ibid.

105 The Yamano Unit had meanwhile withdrawn to the eastern bank of the Pulangi River following a brief engagement near Linabo late in May. These air ground service troops remained in the mountains until the surrender. Philippine Operations Record, Phase Three, op. cit. Vol. II, Suppl., pp. 227-8.

106 In accordance with a 100th Division order, the main strength of the Digos Sector Unit had displaced from Padada to the vicinity northwest of Digos between 23 and 25 April. On 1 May these newly organized defenses were attacked, and four days later the Digos Sector Unit began to withdraw northward toward the Japanese main positions. (Statement by Col. Rinzo Shizuru, commander, 163d Independent Infantry Battalion.)

107 The 3d Special Base Force and the Army air service troops in Davao had meanwhile been placed under the operational control of the 100th Division. (Statement by Lt. Gen. Harada, previously cited.)

108 Ibid.

109 Following this transfer the tactical grouping of the Tooth Division was as follows:

Ibid.

110 The Digos Sector Unit had meanwhile arrived in the Wangan area on 21 May. The naval forces which had been operating with this unit joined the naval units under Rear Adm. Doi. The Digos Sector Unit (less naval elements) was ordered to occupy positions southeast of Wangan and northwest of Ula and come under the command of the Right Front Unit. Ibid.

111 Ibid.

112 On 9 June, the enemy launched an attack against Mandog which the Japanese evacuated two days later. After 14 June, however, the enemy appeared to withdraw from this sector and thereafter no large scale engagements were fought on the left bank of the Davao River. (Statement by Comdr. Saji, previously cited.)

113 Statement by Lt. Gen. Harada, previously cited.

114 The remnants of the 1st Battalion, 74th Infantry, and the South Sector Unit, 30th Division, which had been driven into the mountains along Highway 3 by the swift enemy advance in central Mindanao had meanwhile been attached to the Hirayama Unit early in June.

115 This battalion arrived in the newly assigned area early in July. (Statement by Lt. Gen. Harada, previously cited.)

116 Ibid.

117 The Sarangani Sector Unit, in the vicinity of Mt. Matutum, about 20 miles northwest of Sarangani Bay, was attacked in mid-July. On 1 August, this unit withdrew deeper into the mountains to the northeast. Summary of Operations, 30th Division (Hyo) Force, op. cit.

118 The American carrier task force which sortied through the South China Sea in January 1945 further disrupted the tenuous sea lines of communication. (Statement by Capt. Atsushi Oi, Staff Officer (Operations), General Escort Command.)

119 Cf. Chapter XVIII.

120 Breakdown of the Japanese ground forces employed in the defense of the Philippine Islands, 1944-45, is as follows:

121 Data regarding the number of provisional battalions organized by the Japanese in the Philippine Islands is included in the statement by Maj. Gen. Haruo Konuma, Deputy-Chief of Staff, Fourteenth Area Army. (Cf. Chapter XV, p. 49, 65 and 67.)

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